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we find that the shale revolution raised US relative wages by around 0.84 percent,
whereas Mexican and Canadian wages declined by 1.12 and 1.43 percent, respec-
tively. Judging by countries’ ability to sell goods to the US, China is the main
beneficiary of the shale revolution with increased US exports of more than $14
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Sebastian Rüth, and seminar participants in Heidelberg and Mannheim for helpful discus-
sions. David Autor offered valuable comments on an early stage of the project. Declarations
of interest: none.
1
1 Introduction
When in 1947 the now-dissolved U.S. Bureau of Mines published its first report
on the energy trade of the United States, the country ran an energy-trade
surplus of more than six percent. At the time, energy was exported mainly in
form of coal and lignite, and destined for Europe whose coal industry was still
recovering from the war (Routledge, 1968). In the following years, too, the
US exported more energy than it imported, but this changed when Venezuela
and the Netherland Antilles began shipping crude oil to the US. Starting in
1952, the US consistently imported more energy than it exported, generating
an energy-trade deficit that, at its peak in 2008, made up about half the total
US deficit. Only eleven years later, this changed when—after almost seven
decades—the US again exported more energy than it imported (EIA, 2020).1
Several technical developments and their commercialization allowed for this
revolution. Rocks, in particular, formations of shale that were once viewed of
no commercial value are now supplying the US with large amounts of oil and
gas. The shale revolution is gradually reshaping the industrial structure of the
US and to a smaller extent that of other countries. The goal of this paper is
to quantify these changes.2
A productivity-driven growth of an industry typically leads to higher over-
all wages in the country and, as a consequence, the other industries in the
1The energy-trade statistics are now published by the U.S. Energy Information Admin-
istration (EIA), a subsidiary of the United States Department of Energy. While imports
of crude oil are currently still larger than exports, the US is now exporting considerable
amounts of natural gas and petroleum products such as gasoline.
2Hughes (2013) uses the term ‘shale revolution’; a term we adopt here. For brevity, we
may sometimes simply use ‘shale’. In the literature, the term fracking revolution is used as
well. We provide a formal definition of what we mean by shale revolution in Section 5.
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country lose competitiveness and there may be some form of Dutch-disease-
type crowding out. But not all industries lose from shale. The industries that
build and maintain the oil and gas infrastructure are likely to gain. Other in-
dustries benefit from shale because they require cheap energy or because they
are able to tap on the physical capital and, especially, the human capital the
oil and gas industry has been building up over the past two decades. In the
terminology of our model, the tighter an industry is linked to the oil and gas
industry, the more likely it is to benefit from shale.
In our framework, industries are linked by productivity linkages so that an
industry may benefit from possible productivity spillovers from other indus-
tries. The shale revolution is modeled as an increase of the productivity of the
oil and gas industry in the US.
There are many possible factors that may link industries. Two industries
may be linked because they require similar technologies, because they draw
from the same pool of human capital, because one may be a supplier or a
buyer in the other industry’s production chain, because they require similar
infrastructure and similar institutions, or because they have similar climatic,
geographic, or geological prerequisites. None of the factors listed are easily
observed, nor does it seem possible to identify easily which factor (or factors)
cause a link between industries. We can observe, however, the result of such a
link in the data. When two industries are linked, they tend to occur in pairs;
countries that are productive in one of the industries will tend to be productive
in the other as well. On the other hand, when two industries are not linked,
their occurrence in the data should mimic random draws.
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Figure 1: The Shale Revolution
Left hand panels: US oil and gas production (top) and exports and imports
(bottom) over time (Source: EIA, in quadrillion BTU). Shaded area: 2005 -
2015, period under study in this paper. Right hand panel top: Estimated
US productivity and estimated US primary productivity in the oil and gas
industry. Bottom: US production share (US production relative to world
production) and export share.
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This approach of modeling and estimating industry linkages is a modified
version of an approach proposed by Hidalgo, Klinger, Barabási, and Hausmann
(2007). The main difference between the two approaches is that we rigorously
incorporate the industry linkages into an economic model. This allows us to
conduct comparative statics exercises and thus to assess the general equilib-
rium effects of shale. There is a cost to this more rigorous approach in terms of
data requirements. The approach here requires information about countries’
internal trade flows, i.e., flows of goods that are produced and consumed in
the same country. Unlike the bilateral flows used in Hidalgo et al. (2007),
internal flows are available only for relatively coarse industry classes and only
for a relatively short period of time, in our case from 2005 to 2015. The data,
thus, cover the beginning of the shale revolution and the first decade, but the
results we report for 2015 are likely to underestimate the effect one would find
with more recent data.3
This paper contributes in several ways to the existing literature. First,
the paper shows how the type of industry linkages suggested in Hidalgo et al.
(2007) can be modeled rigorously in an economic model. Our theoretical
framework is a Ricardian model of trade with Eaton and Kortum (2002) tech-
nology that we extend to allow for productivity linkages. We are not aware
of previous attempts to model industry linkages in this fashion. The recent
3While one of the largest producers, the US is still a relatively small exporter of oil and
gas. See lower right panel of figure 1. Various factors impede the trade. Until December
2015, for example, the US banned the export of domestically produced crude oil (Clark,
2014). Exporting gas and refined petroleum was possible under the ban. Another important
impediment is the missing infrastructure such as pipelines and ports. For an overview of
the recent infrastructure developments and infrastructure restrictions see EIA (2015a, 2018,
2019). API (2017) expects the “rapid infrastructure development” currently undergoing, to
“continue for a prolonged period of time”.
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economic literature with industry linkages focuses primarily on input-output
linkages. Acemoglu et al. (2012), for example, show in a model with input-
output linkages how shocks at the level of the individual industry may lead to
aggregate fluctuations.
Productivity linkages and input-output linkages serve different purposes
and should be viewed as complements. When studying structural changes
over a period of many years, as we do here, input-output linkages themselves
respond to the structural change under study. Productivity linkages avoid
this endogeneity problem (we continue this discussion in Section 2). The
contribution of the paper to this literature is to propose a framework that
allows us to study the gradual and long-lasting structural changes we are
witnessing with the shale revolution.
Second, by modeling the growth of an industry in a general equilibrium
setting, the paper contributes to the literature on the Dutch disease. Corden
and Neary (1982), Krugman (1987) and Matsuyama (1992) are important
papers in this field.
Finally, the paper contributes to the literature on the shale revolution.
Muehlenbachs et al. (2015) study the effect of shale gas development on lo-
cal housing markets. Using a spatial equilibrium model, Bartik et al. (2019)
estimate the local welfare effects of shale and report an average willingness
to pay for allowing fracking of $2,500 per household annually. Feyrer et al.
(2017) estimate the effect of shale production on income and find that within
100 miles of a well, one million dollars of new oil and gas production generates
$257,000 in wages and $286,000 in royalty and business income (see also James
6
and Smith, 2020; Feyrer et al., 2020). Our contribution to this literature is
to show how the shale revolution gradually reshapes the economic structure
of the US. Doing so, we extend the work of Arezki et al. (2017) who study
the effect of shale gas on the US manufacturing sector. Moreover, our setting
allows us to assess the effect of shale on the economic structure in countries
other than the US.
In line with our expectations, US wages increase with the productivity
growth of the oil and gas industry. In our baseline comparative statics exercise,
we find that US wages in 2015 increased by 0.84 percent relative to the average
wage in our sample because of the shale revolution. Wages in Mexico and
Canada, the two main trading partners of the US, decreased by 1.12 and 1.43
percent. These decreases are most likely driven by the fact that both countries
are themselves large oil and gas producers. For 2015, we find that the Canadian
oil and gas industry lost more than a third of its output (almost $100 billion)
because of shale. The Mexican oil and gas industry lost 40 percent (almost
$25 billion).4
Within the US, only few other industries benefit directly from the shale
revolution. The main beneficiary is refined petroleum whose output in 2015
is increased by more than 10 percent because of shale. A large part of the US
vehicle production (almost 10 percent, or $65 billion) is replaced by imports
from abroad (mainly from Canada, Japan and Germany). In fact, the industry
that gains most from shale (after the fossil-energy industries in the US) is the
4These numbers are calculated in a comparative statics exercise in which only a sin-
gle parameter differs from the original equilibrium. All other 120,000 parameters of the
model, including the other primary productivities, trade costs, consumption shares are kept
unchanged.
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Canadian vehicle industry. Judging by countries’ ability to sell goods to the
US, China is the main beneficiary of shale with increased exports to the US
of more than $14 billion (7 percent) in 2015. Other large beneficiaries are
Germany and Japan. Saudi Arabia and Russia, on the other hand, see their
US exports drop by 48 and 33 percent respectively.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section (Section 2) motivates
our choice to use productivity linkages and discusses why using input-output
linkages would not be appropriate. Section 3 presents the theoretical frame-
work. Section 4 describes the empirical framework, the data, and discusses the
estimation results. Section 5 presents the results of the comparative statics
exercises and a summary in Section 6 concludes. An online appendix gives
additional information about the data and the estimation procedure, and pro-
vides tables for the robustness analysis.
2 Industry Linkages in the Short and in the
Long-Run
The shale revolution is transforming the US economy over a period of many
years, and the term evolution, rather than revolution, may be more adequate
to describe the slow, incremental technical advances over the past decades
(Alexander et al., 2011). Studying how the shale revolution transforms the
US economy requires what one may call long-run industry linkages. The in-
dustry linkages should reflect technical characteristics that should themselves
be unaffected by the structural change. This rules out the use of input-output
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linkages. In this section, we explain this position and motivate the approach
taken in this paper.
Imagine, for the moment, a situation in which the US bans the production
of (crude) oil and gas in the country and suppose that the ban is permanent
and unexpected. What would be the consequences of such a decision?
The US input-output tables give good indications of the immediate conse-
quences of the ban. The oil and gas industry itself does not supply many other
industries with its products, but it is the main supplier of petroleum refiner-
ies, whose output is used in virtually any other industry in form of gasoline,
diesel or heating oil (see also the discussion in Section 4). The reduced sup-
ply of these products directly affects all other industries in the US and given
the current dependence on domestically produced oil and gas, the immediate
economic impact of the ban would be severe.
As time goes by, the economy will adapt. Imports of oil and gas from
abroad will increase and will make up for parts of the lost domestic production.
Some firms will try to find alternatives to oil and gas, and other will develop
energy-saving production processes. Since these adaption change the flows
of intermediate goods between the industries, they will necessarily alter the
input-output linkages.
In addition to the diversion of input-output flows, the closure of the domes-
tic oil and gas industry will have other, more indirect consequences. The most
obvious of these is probably the productive knowledge and know-how that is
lost when the industry’s workers move on to other professions, and universities
stop offering petroleum engineering and related courses. These indirect effects,
9
too, may have an impact on other industries.
The question that remains to be answered in this thought experiment is,
then, how we may assess the long-run impact of the ban. Is the presence of a
domestic oil and gas industry essential for some of the other industries? Does
the absence of an oil and gas industry systematically weaken (or strengthen)
other industries? One possible way to answer these question is to study in-
dustry patterns in other countries, and, in the way specified by the theoretical
model, this is the approach taken in this paper.
In our theoretical framework, industry linkages are productivity linkages
and we assume that the linkages equation is log-linear with constant coeffi-
cients,
logAki,t =
K∑
l=1,l 6=k
βlk logAli,t + logα
k
i,t. (1)
Country i’s productivity in industry k at time t, Aki,t, is a function of the
productivities of the country’s other industries at the same point in time.
Productivity gains in one industry may spill over to other industries but we
rule out spillovers from other countries or other points in time. The industry
coefficients, βlk, show the (direct) link between two industries l and k. In
line with our assumption that the coefficients reflect technical relationships
between industries, we assume that they are constant across countries and
vary only slowly over time. For the quantitative analysis in Section 4, the
industry coefficients are estimated using data from 60 countries over a period
of 11 years. Since productivity is not observable, we estimate the industry
coefficients using the industry-exporter-time fixed-effects from the regression
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of a standard gravity equation. Section 4 discusses the estimation procedure.
Finally, the primary productivities, αki,t, capture the part of a country’s
productivity that is not already picked up by any possible spillovers from
other industries. The primary productivities reflect a country’s endowment
with the productivity factors that are necessary in the production of industry
k’s output (e.g., knowledge, know-how, or climatic and geographic factors).
In this framework, the shale revolution is modeled as an increase of the US
primary cabability in the oil and gas industry (see Section 5).
Solving equation (1), we find
logAki,t =
K∑
l=1
λlk logαki,t (2)
where the industry linkages, λlk, are the entries of the linkages matrix Λ that
can be calculated using
Λ = (I −B)−1 , (3)
where B is the matrix of industry coefficients (with zeros on the diagonal) and
I is the identity matrix. Equation (3) reveals some formal similarities between
the model here and the input-output model. The industry coefficients, βlk,
correspond to the entries of the direct requirement matrix, the productivity
linkages, λlk, correspond to the entries of the total requirement matrix, and
the right hand side of equation (3) corresponds to the Leontief inverse. Given
the functional form assumption in (1) where productivity enters both the left
and the right hand side, this similarity was expected.
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3 Theoretical Framework
The variant of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model we use here is a simpli-
fied version of the original model and has been discussed before in Donaldson
(2018), Costinot et al. (2011), Levchenko and Zhang (2016), and others. We
extend this model to allow industries to be linked so that an industry’s pro-
ductivity may benefit from spillovers from other industries. From the point
of view of the individual firm, the linkages are external and do not affect the
firm’s optimization problem so that the main properties of the original model
are preserved. In particular, Walras’ law continues to hold and the model is
homogeneous of degree zero in wages. The original model is nested in our
model as a special case when industries are presumed independent.
Industry linkages are productivity linkages, but since productivity is not
directly observable, we will define industry linkages as capability linkages.
Capability linkages and productivity linkages are equivalent in this setting be-
cause of the homogeneity property. A country’s (export) capability is defined
as
κki =
Aki
wi
,
where Aki is country i’s productivity in industry k relative to the country’s wage
rate. This ratio of productivity over wages is sometimes called competitiveness
in the literature.5
Consider a static world economy with i = 1, ..., I countries. The world is
5Capabilities, too, are not observable but they are observable in relative terms, i.e.,
country i’s capability relative to some other country’s capability. This relative observability
will be sufficient to estimate the industry linkages.
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Ricardian with each country endowed with a single factor of production (labor)
and trade is driven by productivity differences. In each country, there are
k = 1, ..., K industries (sectors) and in each industry, there are infinitely many
competitive firms. Each firm produces one of infinitely many varieties ω ∈ Ω
of an industry’s output. Labor can move freely across firms and industries,
but not across countries. Let Li denote country i’s labor endowment and wi
its wage rate. We drop time-subscripts in this section, to keep the notation
simpler.
Preferences Preferences are given by a utility function of the form
Ui =
K∏
k=1
(
Qki
)µki (4)
where Qki is a basket of the varieties of the good produced by industry k.
We assume that
∑K
k=1 µ
k
i = 1 so that µ
k
i indicates the fraction of income
that households spend on industry k goods. The varieties are aggregated
symmetrically by a Dixit-Stiglitz-Spence aggregator
Qki =
(∫
Ω
qki (ω)
σ−1
σ dω
) σ
σ−1
(5)
where qki (ω) is the quantity of variety ω of industry k consumed in i. House-
holds maximize (4) subject to their budget constraint, wiLi =
∑K
k=1 P
k
i Q
k
i ,
where P ki is the CES price of the Dixit-Stiglitz-Spence aggregator.
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Technology Markets are competitive and firms set prices equal to marginal
costs
(
wi/z
k
i (ω)
)
where zki (ω) is the firm’s labor productivity drawn randomly
from a Fréchet distribution with a cumulative distribution function of the form
F ki = exp
{
−
(
z
Aki
)−θ}
.
Here, Aki is a scale parameter; the larger A
k
i , the larger the probability that
a country draws a high productivity (the mean of the Fréchet distribution is
linear in Aki ). We refer to A
k
i as country i’s productivity in industry k. In the
original Eaton & Kortum model, Aki is exogenous. When we introduce industry
linkages below, Aki becomes an endogenous variable. The second parameter of
the Fréchet distribution, θ, is a shape parameter that affects the spread of the
distribution. The smaller θ, the larger the “overlap” of the distributions in the
different countries and the more trade takes place within the same industry.
As θ gets larger, the countries will tend to specialize in distinct industries (see
footnote 7 for more).
The productivity draws are independent across countries. Once a produc-
tivity is drawn, anyone in the country is free to produce the variety and every
producer of that variety in the country has access to the same production
technology. No producer has market power and all prices will be set equal to
marginal costs. Trade is subject to iceberg costs, that is, the cost of delivering
one unit of a variety from i to j is dkij ≥ 1 and we assume that
dkij ≤ dkij′dkj′j for all i, j, j′.
14
Given the assumptions above, the price of variety ω in sector k in country j
purchased from country i is given by
pkij (ω) = p
k
ii (ω) d
k
ij.
This price is a potential (or hypothetical) price because j will only purchase
ω from i if i happens to be the least expensive source. The actual price paid
in j is given by the lowest of all hypothetical prices, that is
pkj (ω) = min
i∈I
{
pkij (ω)
}
= min
{
wi
zki (ω)
dkij
}
.
Under the assumption that productivities are drawn from a Fréchet distribu-
tion, the hypothetical prices, pkij (ω), are distributed exponentially. Since the
minimum of a set of exponentially distributed variables is as well distributed
exponentially, pkj (ω) is distributed as well exponentially. The probability that
i is the least cost producer of variety ω to destination j is then given by
πkij = Pr
{
pkij (ω) ≤ min
s∈Iri
pksj (ω)
}
=
(
Aki
widkij
)θ
∑
s∈I
(
Aks
wsdksj
)θ . (6)
Where we used the fact that both expressions in the curly braces are exponen-
tially distributed.6 Since there are infinitely many varieties in each industry,
this probability is also the fraction of k-varieties that country j buys from
6Let X1, ..., Xn be independent and exponentially distributed random variables with
parameters λ1, ..., λn, then min {X1, ..., Xn} is also exponentially distributed with parameter
λ = λ1 + ...+λn. If x and y are independent and exponentially distributed, i.e., x ∼ exp (λ)
and y ∼ exp (µ), then Pr {x ≤ y} = λλ+µ .
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country i.7
Industry linkages take the form of capability linkages. The particular func-
tional form assumption is log-linear with constant coefficients,
log κki =
K∑
l=1,l 6=k
βlk log κli + log ρ
k
i , (7)
where ρki is the primary capability of country i in industry k and β
lk are
called industry coefficients. Given the functional form assumption, a country’s
capability originates from two sources. First, an industry’s capability may be
influenced by the capabilities of the other industries in the country. The
sum on the right hand side of equation (7) aggregates the contributions of
the other industries (of the network of industries). The second source is a
country’s primary capability ρki . This is a form of remainder that includes
everything not already captured by the contribution of the network. We rule
out spillovers from other countries. Solving equation (7) we find
log κki =
K∑
l=1
λlk log ρli (8)
7 With Xkij denoting sector k trade flows from country i to country j, this share can
be written as πkij = X
k
ij/X
k
j where X
k
j is country j’s consumption of sector k goods, i.e.,
Xkj =
∑
sX
k
sj . The share π
k
ij approaches either 0 or 1 as we increase the shape parameter
θ of the Fréchet distribution since
lim
θ→∞
πkij = lim
θ→∞
(
Aki
widkij
)θ
/min
s∈I

(
Aks
wsdksj
)θ
which equals 1 for i = s and 0 otherwise. In words, as θ increases, the countries tend to
specialize in distinct industries and no intra-industry trade takes place. In some sense, our
model includes the model of Dornbusch et al. (1977) as a special case when I = 2.
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where the industry linkages, λlk, are the entries of the linkages matrix Λ which
can be found using equation (3). Homogeneity of degree zero in wages implies
that the linkages equation must be independent of wages and can, therefore,
be written as
logAki =
K∑
l=1
λlk logαki (9)
where αki is country i’s primary productivity in industry k. The relationship
between αki and ρ
k
i is then given by
log ρki = logα
k
i − logwi
(
1−
K∑
l=1
βlk
)
. (10)
The primary capability is determined by the difference between the primary
productivity and a country’s wages weighted by the column-sums of (I −B).
Equilibrium Assuming balanced trade, consumption in i must equal
production in i,
K∑
k=1
QkiP
k
i =
I∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
QkjP
k
j π
k
ij
and with expenditure matching income in equilibrium, the condition can be
written as
wiLi =
I∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
πkijµ
k
jwjLj (11)
where wiLi on the left hand side of equation (11) is country i’s wage income and
the expression on the right hand side indicates the sources of these payments.
The product µkjwjLj is the size of the market for sector k goods in country
j, and country i supplies a share of πkij to this market. Summing over sectors
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and countries then gives total payments reveived by firms in i.
Equation (11) closes the model and determines the wage vector. The model
has three sets of endogenous variables, wages (equation 11), market shares
(equation 6) and productivities (equation 8, with κki = A
k
i /wi). The wage of
one country will serve as the numéraire.
4 Estimation Framework, Data and Results
The comparative statics exercises require a number of parameters whose es-
timation we describe in this section. Our first step will be to estimate the
export capabilities that form the basis for the industry linkages and the pro-
ductivities. Then, with the capabilities at hand, we can estimate the industry
linkages.
For the entire empirical part, we will stay within the framework outlined in
section 3; both regression equations are derived from theoretical relationships
discussed before. With the exception of the gravity control variables (e.g.,
distance between countries), population (Li), and the trade elasticity (θ), all
parameters are derived from a single data set on trade flows. What we do
here is, in some sense, to split the information contained in these flows into
endogenous components and into parameters that—for the exercises studied
here—one may reasonably consider exogenous.
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4.1 Empirical Framework
Dividing equation (6) by the same expression for another exporter and replac-
ing πkij by X
k
ij/X
k
j and A
k
i /wi by κ
k
i , gives a gravity equation of the form
(
Xkij
Xki′j
)
=
(
κki
κki′
)θ( dkij
dki′j
)−θ
. (12)
In this Ricardian model, sector k trade flows from i to j (relative to the same
flows from another exporter) are larger, the larger i’s export capability relative
to the export capability of i′. Similarly, trade flows are larger, the lower the
trade costs between two countries, again, in relative terms.
We follow the literature and estimate the gravity equation with ppml (Pois-
son pseudo maximum likelihood). See Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and
Mayer and Head (2002) for a discussion. In order to derive an estimation equa-
tion from equation (12), we first take logs and add an importer-industry fixed
effect to take care of the difference over exporters. Then we replace θ log κki
by an exporter-industry fixed effect and −θ log dkij by δkijDij, where Dij is a
vector of gravity control variables that we use to measure the cost of trading
between countries. Dij includes an intra-fixed effect that indicates when im-
porter and exporter are the same country. Finally, adding time-subscripts and
a disturbance term gives the estimation equation
Xkij,t = exp
(
δki,t + δ
k
j,t + δ
k
ij,tDij,t
)
+ ηkij,t. (13)
The data for the gravity control variables are from Head et al. (2010) and
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include, for example, a measure of distance between i and j and indicators of
a common language or a common currency. Appendix A.1 gives more infor-
mation. The control variables are not industry-specific but since we estimate
equation (13) for each industry separately, the coefficients may vary over in-
dustries.
Equation (13) identifies only relative exporter-industry fixed effects (δki,t −
δki′,t) and therefore only relative capabilities (log κ
k
i,t − log κki′,t). This will be
important for the comparative statics exercises because it restricts the type of
question we may ask there. Calculating prices, for example, requires informa-
tion about the level of capabilites and the relative capabilities we can identify
here are not sufficient. The comparative statics exercises are, therefore, mute
with respect to prices and in particular with respect to welfare. We return to
this point again in the next section.
We denote the log-difference over exporters with a tilde as in
κ̃ki,t =
κki,t
κki′,t
. (14)
Other relative variables such as d̃kij,t or ρ̃
k
i,t are defined accordingly. In order
to avoid choosing a reference country, we use the geometric mean over all
exporters as our normalization factor so that κ̃ki,t = κ
k
i,t/
∏
s
(
κks,t
) 1
I .
In the second regression, we estimate the industry linkages. In Section 3,
we specified the linkages equation in levels (equation 7), but relative capabili-
ties are sufficient to identify the linkages. Dividing equation (7) by the same
expression for another exporter gives our estimation equation for the industry
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coefficients
log κ̃ki,t =
K∑
l=1
βlk log κ̃li,t + δ
k
i + η
k
i,t, (15)
where we already replaced the relative primary capability, ρ̃ki,t, with an exporter-
industry fixed effect, δki , and a residual, η
k
i,t, that we minimize. We treat the
residual as an integral part of countries’ primary capability. The industry co-
efficients (βlk) do not carry a time-index nor an exporter-index, in line with
our assumption that the coefficients identify technical relationships between
industries that are constant across countries and vary only slowly over time.
For the 11 years in our sample, we assume that the coefficients are constant.
The industry-coefficients are, therefore, estimated using capability estimates
from 60 countries over a period of 11 years.
Estimation is by OLS. Given the log-linear form of the linkages equation,
we can estimate equation (15) without the need to specify the trade elasticity θ
by using (δki,t− δki′,t) rather than log κ̃ki,t. The difference (δki,t− δki′,t) corresponds
to the convolution θ log κ̃ki,t. Specifying θ will be necessary in Section 5, when
we calculate the equilibrium.
4.2 Constructing the Internal and Bilateral Trade Flows
Our main data are sector-specific trade flows (bilateral and internal) that we
construct from the OECD inter-country input-output data set (OECD, 2018).
Summing the rows of the input-output tables, gives the trade flows required
for our exercises. The original data contain flows for the years 2005 to 2015 for
65 countries and 37 industries and are classified according to ISIC Revision 4.
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The OECD data covers the entire world economy and contains all economic
activities ranging from agriculture via manufacturing to the services industries,
so that summing the flows over industries and importers (
∑
s
∑
mX
m
is ) gives
a country’s gross production. The OECD data set includes a position for the
rest of the world (ROW) that subsumes all flows of the countries that do not
appear explicitly.
Some industries and some countries require special attention because of
poor coverage. We move five countries (Costa Rica, Cyprus, Iceland, Cambo-
dia, and Malta) to the rest of the world because of many missing data, leaving
us with 59 + 1 countries. The 59 countries that appear explicitly in the data
set cover more than 90 percent of world economic output and of total trade
flows.
The original OECD data set aggregates industries 05 (coal) with 06 (oil
and gas) into an aggregate called 05T06. We split this aggregate into its two
constituents using UN Comtrade data for the bilateral flows (Xkij,t) and EIA
data for countries’ internal flows (Xkii,t). The EIA data (EIA, 2019) are pub-
lished in quantity units that we convert into monetary units by using the ratio
of imports reported by Comtrade relative to the imports reported by the EIA
to evaluate the internal trade flows. Appendix A.1 provides detailed infor-
mation and a discussion. Finally, we merge five of the original 37 industries
with neighboring classes because of missing data. Our data set then has 33
industries, 60 countries (exporters and importers) and covers the eleven years
from 2005 to 2015.
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Figure 2: US Export Capabilities Over Time
US relative export capabilities (left) and relative primary export capabilities
(right) over time. The capabilities are scaled by θ and shown are the convolu-
tions θ log κ̃ki,t and θ log ρ̃
k
i,t. Industries: 06 (Oil and gas), 09 (Mining support
service activities), and 19 (Refined petroleum).
4.3 Results and Discussion: Capabilities
Figure 2 shows how relative US capabilities evolve during our sample period.
The left hand panel shows capabilities, the right hand panel shows primary
capabilities (both in logarithms and scaled by θ). In 2005, industry 06 (crude
oil and gas) was the least competitive industry in the US, but experienced a
steep increase during the sample period. In 2015, industry 06 still belongs to
the less competitive US industries and even at the current pace, it will take
some time until its export capabilities reach the level of many other industries
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in the US. In line with the steep increase in 06’s export capabilities, the US
experienced a sharp increase in the primary capability of 06 (right hand panel).
Two other industries (09 and 19) are highlighted in figure 2; both will
turn up at various points in the discussion. Industry 09 is a service called
mining support service activities and may (jointly with industry 06) reflect
what we called the shale revolution in the introduction. We return to this
point again in Section 5, when we discuss how to model the shale revolution in
the comparative statics exercises. The third industry highlighted, industry 19,
is refined petroleum and thus from an input-output point of view down-stream
relative to 06. Similarly to industries 06 and 09, industry 19 experienced a
significant increase during our sample period.
The noticeable growth in competitiveness of the oil and gas industry in
the US becomes even more apparent when we look at deviations from 2005 as
shown in figure 3. The capabilities of industry 06 increased by more than any
of the other industries in the US. Industries 09 and 19 come second and third.
Industry 09 is fairly volatile with a pronounced decline at around 2010. A
similar picture emerges when we look at primary capabilities. Here, industry
09 comes first, followed by industry 06 and 19.
4.4 Results and Discussion: Productivity Linkages
There are 1089 (33×33) linkages with a mean of 0.37 and a standard deviation
of 0.49. 16.9 percent of the linkages are negative. The distribution is right
skewed with a maximum of 3.05 and a minimum of −1.03. Figure 4 shows a
heat-plot of the linkages matrix Λ with larger values in dark and smaller values
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Figure 3: US Export Capabilities Over Time (Levels Relative to their Level
in 2005)
US export capabilities over time relative to their 2005 level. Shown are the con-
volutions θ(log κ̃ki,t − log κ̃ki,2005) and θ(log ρ̃ki,t − log ρ̃ki,2005). Industries: 06 (Oil
and gas), 09 (Mining support service activities), and 19 (Refined petroleum).
in bright shading. The diagonal is prominently showing which indicates that,
typically, the principal link is between an industry’s capability and its own
primary capability. There are some larger off-diagonal entries as well but
most often, the largest link is situated on the diagonal. The in-strengths (the
column-sums of Λ) and the out-strengths (the row-sums of Λ) vary significantly
from industry to industry. Table 6 in the Appendix shows the in-strengths and
the out-strengths of all industries.
Since most of the links in the linkages matrix are fairly weak, a network
representation is appropriate (here we follow Hidalgo et al., 2007). A network
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Figure 4: A Heat-Plot of the Industry Linkages
A heat-plot of the linkages matrix (Λ) with larger values in dark and smaller
values in bright shading.
representation often helps in providing intuition about the structure of a net-
work by simplifying the network by dropping the weaker linkages. In order
to assure that the network remains connected, we first generate the maximum
spanning tree. This is a tree (a network without cycles) that connects all
industries and that maximizes the sum of the linkages (not including the diag-
onal of Λ). The maximum spanning tree is unique for weighted graphs when
all weights are distinct (as we have here). We then add the 60 largest links to
yield an average degree of around 3.
In the network representation in figure 5, each node represents an industry
and nodes are linked either because they are linked by the maximum spanning
tree or because they belong to the stronger links in original matrix. We lay out
the network using a force-spring algorithm where the nodes are represented
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Figure 5: The Industry Network
A network representation of the industry linkages. The node size is propor-
tional to an industry’s degree. The layout and the coloring reflect the four
communities in the network. The figure is drawn with the software package
Gephi.
as equally charged particles and the edges are assumed to be springs (the
algorithm we use is described in Blondel et al., 2008). The layout is then
determined by the relaxed positions of the particles (the nodes). We retouched
the layout manually to avoid overlapping links and untangle dense clusters.
The figure is drawn using the software package Gephi.
The node size is proportional to the industry’s degree in the binary network
and the coloring corresponds to the communities in the network. Using Gephi’s
default algorithm to calculate the network’s modularity, we find four commu-
nities. The communities detected here, roughly correspond to the structure
of the ISIC classification system. Typical entries of the cluster on the right
belong to the first entries of the industry classification system followed by the
large community in the bottom center whose industries belong to the middle
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part of the classification. The community on the left typically contains services
that appear in the last part of the classification. Industries 06 and 19 form a
separate community with industry 13T15 (Textiles, including synthetic fibers)
serving as a bridge to the rest of the network.
From the point of view of someone who looks for patterns in the produc-
tivity data, the weak link of industry 06 with the rest of the industries reflects
the fact that industry 06 typically does not pair often with other industries,
except for an occasional pairing with 19. Similarly, industry 19 does not seem
to pair with many other industries, except industries 06 and 13T15.
From the point of view of our model and its underlying assumptions, the
weak link of industry 06 with the rest of the industries indicates that the factors
(the technologies, the human capital, etc.) required to produce oil and gas are
rather industry-specific and do not seem to transfer easily to other industries.
The industry that is most closely related to the oil and gas industry is the
refined petroleum industry.
The fact that industries 06 and 19 form an independent cluster largely
separate from the rest of the industries, will drive many of the results in the
comparative statics exercises and it is useful to compare our network with two
other industry networks in the literature. First, consider the network discussed
in Hidalgo et al. (2007). While their measure differs from ours, the underlying
data are as well trade flows (though not internal flows). In their network,
too, the oil and gas industry is rather isolated. Given that their network has
almost 800 industries shows that our result is unlikely to be driven by the
smaller number of nodes (industries) in our data set.
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Second, consider the network discussed in Carvalho (2014) which is formed
by input-output flows for 417 industries in the US. In this network, too, the oil
and gas industry is rather isolated and, just as we observe here, its strongest
link is with petroleum refineries. But unlike in our network, petroleum refiner-
ies is one of the best connected industries in the economy with links to almost
any other industry in the country. The connectedness of refined petroleum
reflects the fact that its output (gasoline, diesel, heating oil) are important
inputs in almost any economic activity.
The different connectedness of the 06/19-cluster reflects the different scopes
of the two types of industry linkages. In the short run, refined petroleum and
crude oil and gas (via refined petroleum) have strong links to almost all other
industries and a disruption in any of these two industries will have noticeable
repercussions in the entire US economy. However, in the longer run, the links of
these industries with the rest of the economy are significantly weaker. In fact,
many countries, especially many of the more advanced countries, do not have
very developed industries 06 and 19 and, instead, import gas and petroleum
products from abroad.8
8In 2014, only four countries produced oil or gas from shale commercially (EIA, 2015b).
The United States is by far the dominant producer, producing almost 90 percent of world
output. The other countries are Canada, Argentina, and China. Shale resources, however,
are abundant (EIA, 2013). EIA (2015c) currently lists 46 countries with technically recov-
erable shale oil and shale gas resources. Most of these countries are included in our data
set.
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5 Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
In this section, we conduct the comparative statics exercises that allow us to
assess, how the shale revolution changes the industrial structure of the US
and that of other countries. In the comparative statics exercises, we compare
two equilibria: The original equilibrium (the equilibrium we observe in the
data) and a hypothetical equilibrium that differs from the original because we
change one or more exogenous parameters. In our baseline exercise, we keep
the primary productivity of the US in industry 06 (crude oil and gas) constant
at its 2005 level. The hypothetical equilibrium thus describes a situation in
which the productivity gains made in the industry after 2005 have not taken
place. Comparing the two equilibria then allows us to quantify the effect of
the shale revolution.
5.1 Equilibrium
Our first step is to calculate the original equilibrium (the original wage vector)
for each of the 11 years of the sample. Equation (11) determines wages as a
function of market shares (πkij,t), consumption shares (µ
k
j,t), and population
(Li,t). We use data from the World Bank for countries’ population (see table
7 in the Appendix). Market shares and consumption shares can be calculated
from our data set on trade flows using
πkij,t =
Xkij,t
Xkj,t
and µkj,t =
Xkj,t
Xj,t
,
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where Xkj,t =
∑
sX
k
s,t and Xj,t =
∑
sX
s
j,t. With 60 countries in our sample,
the system has 59 wage equations that need to be solved simultaneously. The
wage of one of the countries serves as the numéraire. Table 7 in the Appendix
shows the equilibrium wages in all 60 countries for 2015. As with capabili-
ties and productivities, we normalize wages using the geometric mean across
all countries. Table 7 also shows countries’ per capita income. Given that
wages in our model are a measure of a country’s overall productivity, the high
correlation between both variables is expected.
With wages at hand, we can calculate the productivities using equation (3)
and the primary productivities using equation (10). At this point, we have to
choose a value for the trade elasticity θ. Our baseline value is θ = 6; Section 5.3
discusses how this choice affects the results. A plot of US productivities and
primary productivities over time is almost identical to the plot with capabilities
in figures (2) and (3) above, and therefore not shown. The main difference
between both figures is a different scaling due to θ.
5.2 Comparative Statics
We define the shale revolution as the technological advances of the US oil
and gas industry that affect the industry’s output after 2005. In the baseline
comparative statics exercise, the primary productivity of industry 06 (crude
oil and gas) in the US serves as a proxy for the factors we want to capture. In
Section 5.3, we discuss this choice and the result of two additional exercises.
In the baseline comparative statics exercise, we replace α̃06US,t by α̃
06
US,2005 in
all years and leave all other primary productivities unchanged. Since equation
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Table 1: The Impact of Shale on Relative Wages
Gains Losses
Country Impact Energy Country Impact Energy
of shale reliance* of shale reliance*
USA 0.84 2.46 Greece -0.19 3.20
Ireland 0.37 0.12 Norway -0.31 13.46
Luxembourg 0.30 0.05 Russia -0.37 12.63
Japan 0.30 0.35 Kazakhstan -0.40 8.58
Switzerland 0.27 0.21 ROW -0.73 11.84
Germany 0.24 0.42 Brunei -0.79 37.02
Czech Republic 0.24 0.81 Colombia -0.86 5.04
Philippines 0.23 0.26 Saudi Arabia -0.94 21.95
Korea 0.23 1.43 Mexico -1.12 5.01
Hong Kong 0.22 0.11 Canada -1.43 5.95
Notes: The impact of shale on relative wages in 2015 in percent (relative
to the geometric mean of all countries). Largest and smallest 10 effects by
impact. Impact is the percentage difference between observed wages and wages
predicted in the baseline comparative statics exercise. * Energy reliance is the
share of energy-related production (ISIC Rev. 4 classes 05, 06, 19) in total
production.
(9) holds in relative terms,
log Ãki,t =
K∑
l=1
λlk log α̃ki,t,
we can use it to calculate relative productivities and in turn, use these with
equation (6) and (11) to solve for wages. Solving for the comparative statics
equilibrium we have, as above, 59 wage equations with the wage of one of the
countries serving as numéraire.
Table 1 shows how shale changes relative wages in the 20 most affected
countries (10 largest increases, 10 largest decreases) in 2015. Table 7 in the
Appendix shows the effect in all countries. According to the model, shale
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raised relative wages in the US by around 0.84 percent in 2015. In Mexico and
Canada, America’s two main trading partners, shale lowered relative wages by
1.12 and 1.43 percent, respectively. Mexico and Canada are both large oil and
gas producers themselves which probably explains the drop in wages. In fact,
all countries for which the model predicts a large, negative impact on wages are
typically large producers of energy products (oil, gas, coal). On the other hand,
countries for which the model predicts a positive effect of shale on wages are
typically only small producers of these items. All western European countries,
for example, are predicted to have slightly higher wages, with the exception
of Norway and Greece, two countries with fairly large energy industries.
Figure (6) shows the impact of shale on US market shares in Mexico,
Canada, and in the US itself over time. The impact is measured as the dif-
ference between the original market shares and the market shares we find in
the comparative statics exercise (∆πkij,t = π
(orig)k
ij,t − π
(cs)k
ij,t ). The two market
shares coincide in 2005 by assumption. A positive difference indicates that in
the original data, we observe a higher market share than in the hypothetical
situation where we turn off the productivity gains in the oil and gas industry.
The market shares of industry 06 (crude oil and gas) increase in all three coun-
tries. The market shares of almost all other industries decrease with only few
exceptions, of which industry 19 (refined petroleum) is the most important
one. US market shares of industry 19 are higher in all three countries. The
network representation of the industry linkages (figure 5) already indicated a
close relationship between industries 06 and 19 with both industries forming
an independent cluster, that is almost unconnected to the other industries.
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Figure 6: The Impact of Shale on Market Shares
The impact of shale on US market shares (πkij,t) in Mexico, Canada, and the
US over time. Positive values indicate higher market share due to shale. By
assumption, the impact is zero in 2005.
Tables 2 to 4 report the impact of shale on trade flows and on industry
output. The model does not allow us to predict the level of the flows, only
flows relative to another exporter, but we may approximate the levels assuming
that the impact on wages is small, relative to the impact on flows. Consider
the following equation that shows how trade flows depend on the parameters
and the variables of the model.
Xkij = π
k
ijµ
k
jwjLj
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Table 2: The Impact of Shale on Trade Flows
Exporter Importer Industry Description Trade flows Impact of shale
Gains observed* predicted* by value* percent
USA USA 06 Crude oil and gas 670.07 347.67 322.40 92.73
USA USA 19 Refined petroleum 404.00 382.11 21.89 5.73
USA Canada 06 Crude oil and gas 16.93 3.74 13.18 351.99
Canada USA 29 Vehicles, trailers 38.12 28.54 9.58 33.58
Japan USA 29 Vehicles, trailers 39.78 33.07 6.71 20.28
Germany USA 29 Vehicles, trailers 38.56 31.93 6.63 20.77
USA Mexico 06 Crude oil and gas 7.66 1.83 5.83 318.93
USA Taiwan 06 Crude oil and gas 6.80 1.30 5.51 424.89
Canada Canada 29 Vehicles, trailers 36.52 31.13 5.39 17.33
Canada Canada 45T47 Wholesale trade 204.03 199.1 4.93 2.48
Losses observed* predicted* by value* percent
USA USA 62T63 IT 548.15 558.87 -10.72 -1.92
Canada Canada 06 Crude oil and gas 93.22 104.46 -11.24 -10.76
USA USA 28 Machinery, nec 284.82 297.76 -12.94 -4.35
USA USA 26 Computers 304.15 322.55 -18.40 -5.71
Saudi Arabia USA 06 Crude oil and gas 11.05 29.94 -18.89 -63.09
Russia USA 06 Crude oil and gas 11.03 30.88 -19.86 -64.30
USA USA 20T21 Chemicals 646.70 667.77 -21.07 -3.16
Mexico USA 06 Crude oil and gas 13.39 35.85 -22.46 -62.66
USA USA 29 Vehicles, trailers 560.55 604.63 -44.09 -7.29
Canada USA 06 Crude oil and gas 51.30 134.82 -83.51 -61.95
Notes: The impact of shale on trade flows (largest and smallest 10 by value in
2015, excluding flows from rest of the world aggregate ROW). Predicted flows
from baseline comparative statics exercise. * Billion US $.
Here, µkj and Lj are known parameters and we have comparative statics predic-
tions for πkij, but we do not have comparative statics predictions for countries’
wages. We may use, however, the wages we found in the original equilibrium
(see Section 5.1) as an approximation. When the US is importer (exporter),
we slightly underestimate (overestimate) the flows. For the other countries,
the bias is reversed.
Table 2 shows the effect of shale on the 20 most affected trade flows for
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2015. By far the largest effect (as measured by value) is observed by the
internal flows of crude oil and gas in the US where the model predicts almost
a doubling of the flows. The flows from the US to its main trading partners
Canada and Mexico are predicted to triple, whereas the flows in the opposite
direction decrease by more than 60 percent. A large part of the internal trade
of vehicles (industry 29) in the US is replaced by imports from abroad (in
particular from Canada, Japan, Germany).
This pattern is confirmed in table 3 that reports aggregate US imports
(
∑
sX
s
i,j=USA,2015). Imports from China increase by more than $14 billion
because of shale. Germany and Japan, too, see their US exports increase
considerably. Countries that observe a decline of their exports to the US are,
again, countries with a large energy industry, such as Saudi Arabia, Russia and
the countries aggregated in ROW (ROW includes countries like Iraq, Iran, and
other Gulf states).
Our last table (table 4) in this section reports industry output (
∑
sX
k
i,s,2015).
Again, we report the 20 most affected industries. The industries that gain most
from shale are industries 06 and 19 in the USA. With the exception of vehi-
cles from Germany and Japan, all other industries in the table that gain are
Canadian. These gains in Canada are offset by a sizeable decline in Canadian
output of crude oil and gas. Seven of the ten industries that lose most are US
American. Industry 29 (vehicles and trailers), for example, is predicted to lose
almost a tenth, or $65 billion, of its output because of shale. The exercise also
predicts large declines for industries 20T21 (Chemicals) and 26 (Computers).
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Table 3: The Impact of Shale on US Imports
Exporter US Imports Impact of shale
Gains observed* predicted* by value* percent
China 215.10 200.92 14.18 7.06
Germany 143.71 130.74 12.97 9.92
Japan 118.82 107.85 10.97 10.17
Ireland 51.49 46.27 5.22 11.29
South Korea 75.19 70.20 4.99 7.10
India 75.45 72.08 3.37 4.67
France 64.78 61.46 3.33 5.41
Great Britain 105.39 102.08 3.31 3.24
Switzerland 31.71 28.67 3.05 10.63
Italy 57.79 54.99 2.80 5.09
Losses observed* predicted* by value* percent
Kazakhstan 3.70 5.49 -1.79 -32.66
Netherlands 31.62 33.60 -1.99 -5.91
Australia 29.87 32.24 -2.37 -7.36
Colombia 7.30 10.38 -3.08 -29.66
Norway 12.32 17.09 -4.76 -27.87
Mexico 76.84 90.05 -13.21 -14.67
Saudi Arabia 19.34 37.55 -18.21 -48.49
Russia 41.23 61.70 -20.48 -33.19
Canada 258.19 311.07 -52.89 -17.00
ROW 235.39 344.09 -108.70 -31.59
Notes: The impact of shale on US imports (largest and smallest 10 by value
for 2015). Predicted imports from baseline comparative statics. * Billion US$.
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Table 4: The Impact of Shale on Industry Output
Country Industry Description Output Impact of shale
Gains observed* predicted* by value* percent
USA 06 Crude oil and gas 765.18 366.61 398.57 108.72
USA 19 Refined petroleum 482.86 436.67 46.20 10.58
Canada 29 Vehicles, trailers 80.60 65.04 15.56 23.92
Canada 45T47 Wholesale trade 244.93 235.98 8.94 3.79
Germany 29 Vehicles, trailers 408.42 400.88 7.54 1.88
Japan 29 Vehicles, trailers 415.59 408.59 6.99 1.71
Canada 69T82 Technical services 166.76 160.24 6.52 4.07
Canada 10T12 Food products 122.20 117.07 5.14 4.39
Canada 20T21 Chemicals 45.35 40.37 4.97 12.32
Canada 24 Basic metals 49.14 44.47 4.67 10.51
Losses observed* predicted* by value* percent
USA 45T47 Wholesale trade 2934.14 2954.40 -20.26 -0.69
USA 69T82 Technical services 3342.31 3365.66 -23.35 -0.69
Russia 06 Crude oil and gas 362.42 386.82 -24.39 -6.31
Mexico 06 Crude oil and gas 33.84 58.57 -24.73 -42.22
USA 28 Machinery, nec 362.21 388.79 -26.58 -6.84
USA 64T66 Finance & insurance 2291.04 2322.17 -31.13 -1.34
USA 26 Computers 365.96 404.85 -38.88 -9.60
USA 20T21 Chemicals 771.76 815.54 -43.77 -5.37
USA 29 Vehicles, trailers 637.81 703.11 -65.30 -9.29
Canada 06 Crude oil and gas 164.81 258.83 -94.02 -36.32
Notes: The impact of shale on industry output (largest and smallest 10 by
value in 2015, excluding industries from the rest of the world aggregate ROW).
Predicted output is output predicted in the baseline comparative statics exer-
cise. * Billion US$.
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5.3 Discussion
The impact of the shale revolution resembles the situation described in the
models of the Dutch disease. The lower an industry’s trade costs, the larger
the impact. In the case of services, where trade costs are often considerable,
the impact of shale is small or negligible.
In this section, we resume some of the discussions we started before. First,
we discuss our choice to model the shale revolution by keeping industry 06
at its 2005 level. Second, we analyze how our choice of setting the trade
elasticity, θ, equal to 6 affects our results and we also discuss how the results
change when we exclude a number of countries with gaps in the data. Finally,
we will discuss the contribution of shale to the structural change in the US
relative to the contribution of other US industries.
5.3.1 Industry 09 and Trade Costs
In our baseline exercise, we used the primary productivity of industry 06 (crude
oil and gas) as a proxy for the factors that allowed for the shale revolution.
There is, however, a second industry (09, mining support service activities)
that may as well reflect some of the technological advances we are interested
in. Some of the technical operations of the mining industry, “particularly
[operations] related to the extraction of hydrocarbons, may also be carried out
for third parties by specialized units as an industrial service, which is reflected
in [industry] 09” (United Nations, 2008, page 79). In fact, the capabilities and
productivities of industry 09 in the US increase just as much as the capabilities
and productivities of industry 06 (see figures 2 and 3). We will, therefore,
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include industry 09 together with 06 in a second comparative statics exercise.
In a third exercise, we keep both the primary productivity and the trade costs
of industry 06 constant at its level in 2005.
Overall, the results of the second exercise closely resembles the results of
the first. Table 8 in the Appendix shows the effect of both exercises on the
US market shares in Mexico. For our baseline exercise, the model predicts a
reduction of the US market share of industry 06 in Mexico from 24.88 percent
to 5.94. For the second exercise, the reduction is slightly smaller to 6.38. The
only noticeable difference between both exercises is the prediction of industry
09 that sees an increase in our baseline model (from 0.06 to 0.11) and a decrease
in the second exercise (from 0.06 to 0.02). For all other industries, there is
almost no difference between the two exercises. A possible explanation for this
is that industry 09 is by far the smallest industry in our sample by value. Total
world consumption of 09 is almost only half the size of the second smallest
industry in the sample.
In the third comparative statics exercise, we keep the primary productivity
of industry 06 and the trade costs of industry 06 at their level in 2005. Here,
too, the numbers do not differ much from the baseline exercise (see Table
8). During the sample period, US trade costs of 06 decrease but most of the
large infrastructure developments take place after 2015. See footnote 3 in the
introduction for more information on the infrastructure developments.
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5.3.2 Trade Elasticity and Countries with Data Gaps
In all comparative statics exercises, we have set the trade elasticity θ equal
to 6. As equation (6) shows, θ influences how changes in productivity carry
over to changes in market shares and via the wage equation to changes in
wages. Mayer and Head (2002) compare the estimation results from several
hundred estimates and classify them according to the methodology used. Their
preferred estimate is 5.03, which is somewhat lower than our choice. Table 8
in the appendix shows how θ affects the US market shares in Mexico we find in
the baseline exercise. Setting θ equal to 3 gives almost identical results to our
baseline choice of 6, but raising the value to 8 increases the predicted impact
of shale. Looking, again, at the US share of industry 06, we see that when θ
equals 8, the model predicts a reduction from 24.88 to 1.67 whereas when θ
equals 6, the reduction is smaller (from 24.88 to 5.94). Overall, a choice of 6
seems more conservative than a value of 8 and reducing θ further only has a
small effect on the results so that we may conclude that the results are robust
with respect to our choice of θ.
In Appendix A.1, we report that for some countries, the output of oil, gas
and coal reported by the EIA differed from the output reported by the OECD.
These were mainly smaller countries (such as Hong Kong or Luxembourg)
and countries with a dominating energy industry (such as Saudi Arabia). In
order to see whether these countries affect the results, we re-calculate the
capabilities, wages and productivities and re-run our baseline comparative
statics exercise for this smaller set of countries. Table 8 in the appendix reports
how this change affects the US market shares in Mexico. Using the smaller
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set of 53 countries, the predicted impact of shale is smaller. For example,
the US market share of industry 06 in Mexico reduces from 24.88 to 8.19
when we exclude these countries rather than from 24.88 to 5.94 in the case
of 60 countries. For all other industries, the predicted changes are small or
negligible, so that having a larger sample seems preferable and any bias caused
by these countries is unlikely to be substantial.
5.3.3 Decomposing the Structural Change in the US
We close this section with a discussion about the contribution of shale to the
structural change in the US, relative to the contribution of other US industries.
Our measure of an industry’s contribution to the country’s structural change is
the industry’s contribution to the country’s wage variations. Above, we have
seen that shale raised wages in 2015 by about 0.84 percent in the baseline
comparative statics exercise. A question this number raises is, whether this
impact is large relative to the impact of the other 32 industries.
In order to answer this question, we conduct for each industry a compar-
ative statics exercise in which we keep the industry’s primary productivity at
the level it had in 2005. Subtracting the resulting wages from the wages of
the original equilibrium gives, for each industry, a series of yearly wage dif-
ferences. The absolute value of these wage differences, relative to the sum of
absolute wage differences of all industries is then our measure of an industry’s
contribution to the economy’s structural change.
Figure 7 shows each industry’s contribution over time. For 2005, the com-
parative statics equilibrium coincides with the original equilibrium so that each
42
Crude oil and gas (06)
Real estate activities (68)
Food products (10T12)
Metal products (25)
Transportation (49T53)
Construction (31T43)
Agriculture (01T03)0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1Share
by
industry
2005 2010 2015
Figure 7: Structural Change in the US (2005 to 2015)
Decomposition of the US overall structural change into parts that can be
attributed to each industry. The contribution of each industry to the overall
structural change is measured by each industry’s contribution to the country’s
wage variation.
industry’s contribution is 1/K = 1/33. The industries’ contributions varies
considerably in the following years. At around the financial crisis in 2007, the
contribution of industry 68 (real estate activities) is particularly prominent.
In recent years, industry 10T12 (food products) is an important contributor to
the US structural change. The contribution of industry 06 (crude oil and gas)
is not particularly large but fairly steady over time. Its impact is more gradual
and persistent than that of many others. It is possible that the contribution of
oil and gas increases, when the recent infrastructure investments in pipelines
and export facilities are reflected in the data.
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6 Summary
This paper quantifies the general equilibrium effects of the shale revolution in
a Ricardian model of trade in which industries are connected by productivity
linkages. In this framework, productivity gains in one industry may spill over
to other industries. The reason for this modeling choice is that the analysis
requires industry linkages that are constant over a longer period and that are
themselves unaffected by the structural change we want to analyze. This rules
out, for example, the use of input-output linkages. The productivity linkages
are external to the firm, so that the model preserves the simple structure of the
original Eaton & Kortum model. Modeling industry linkages in this fashion
in a general equilibrium model seems to be new in the literature.
We model the shale revolution as an increase of the productivity of the oil
and gas industry in the US. These productivity improvements may spill over
to other industries and may, in principle, outweigh any negative impact from
the higher wage level that is caused by the productivity increases (the Dutch
disease).
The industry network implied by the estimated linkages is a modular net-
work in which industries form separate clusters. Industries have tight connec-
tions with industries from the same cluster, but weak connection with indus-
tries in different clusters. The oil and gas industry forms a separate cluster
with petroleum refineries. The productivity improvements in the oil and gas
industry will, therefore, spill over to petroleum refineries, but will have only
minor effects on the productivities of the other industries in the US.
For 2015 (the most recent data available), the comparative statics exercises
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predict slightly higher wages in the US (0.84 percent) relative to the average
wage in all countries in the sample. In Mexico and Canada, Americas two
main trading partners, wages decline. Many industries in the US see their
output reduced because of the higher wages, but the impact varies widely
from industry to industry. In the case of refined petroleum, the higher wages
are outweighed by the productivity spillovers, so that the overall effect is pos-
itive. Since services are not easily traded and thus face much less competition
from abroad, the higher US wages barely affect their output. The impact of
the shale revolution is most pronounced in the case of manufacturing goods
(vehicles, chemicals, electronics, or machinery). Goods that the US previously
would have produced domestically are now replaced by imports from abroad.
China, in particular, is benefiting from this replacement. Given the recent and
planned infrastructure developments, such as the building of new ports and
pipelines, it seems likely that the structural changes reported in this paper are
only the first signs of a more profound structural change of the country in the
coming years.
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A Online Appendix
A.1 The Construction of the Data Set
Constructing Trade Flows from international input-output tables
We calculate the bilateral trade flows by summing up the rows of the interna-
tional input-output tables (OECD, 2018). The original data are in million US
Dollars which we convert into Dollars. Negative values (130 of the 1673100
values are negative) and zeros are replaced by one. We move the following five
countries to the balance position ROW because of many missing data: Costa
Rica, Cyprus, Iceland, Cambodia, and Malta. We use MX1 for Mexico and
CN1 for China. The following industries are merged because of missing data:
90T96 and 97T98 to 90T98; 84 and 85 to 84T85; 31T33, 35T39, and 41T43 to
31T43. This leaves us with 60 exporters and importers (of which one is ROW)
and 32 industries for a period of 11 years (from 2005 to 2015). See table 7 for
a list of the countries included in the analysis.
Splitting Industry 05T06 into 05 and 06 Industry 05T06 is split into
its two components 05 (Coal and lignite) and 06 (Crude oil and gas) using UN
Comtrade data (Harvard Dataverse, 2019) for the bilateral trade flows and
EIA (EIA, 2019) data for the internal trade flows.
The UN Comtrade data are classified according to the Harmonized System
(HS 1992). Since there is no direct concordance between the HS-products and
the industries in ISIC Rev. 4, we use a chain of concordances: from ISIC Rev.
4 to CPC2 to HS (2007) to HS (1992). Following this chain, we assign the
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following HS 1992 classes to ISIC Rev. 4 class 05: 2701, 2702, 2704, 2705,
2706, 2707, 2708 and the following HS (1992) classes to ISIC Rev. 4 class 06:
2709, 2710, 2711, 2712, 2713. Countries that do not appear explicitly in the
OECD Data are allocated to the balance position ROW.
The internal trade of industries 05 and 06 are constructed as the difference
between a country’s production and its exports as reported by the EIA. The
EIA publishes data about several energy sources for more than 160 countries.
Four of these sources are relevant for us. The output of industry 05 (coal an
lignite) corresponds EIA’s total primary coal. The output of industry 06 (crude
oil and gas) corresponds to three series in the EIA data: (1) total petroleum
and other liquids (nonrefined), (2) natural gas, and (3) liquefied petroleum
gases and ethane.
All 59 countries of our data set appear in the EIA data. The remaining
countries are aggregated into the balance position Rest of the World. For
some countries, the EIA reports zero production and zero exports of liquefied
petroleum gases and ethan in the most recent years in the sample. When the
corresponding exports reported by the Comtrade data are positive, we assume
that these data are missing and project the series using a simple linear forecast.
For the US, for example, the EIA reports zero production and zero exports in
2015 whereas the UN Comtrade data report positive export for 2015.
The EIA data are published in quantity units which we convert into mone-
tary units using the ratio of imports as reported by UN Comtrade and imports
as reported by the EIA as a proxy for the price. In the case of natural gas
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(measured in bcf, billion cubic feet), this ratio equals, for example,
Pi,t
[
$
bcf
]
=
Country i’s imports as reported by UN Comtrade [$]
Country i’s imports as reported by EIA [bcf ]
.
The other three price series are constructed in the same fashion. Since the
4-digit HS (1992) classes do not distinguish between natural gas and liquefied
gas, we use the 6-digit data in this case. HS classes 271121, 271119, 271129
correspond to natural gas and HS classes 271114, 271113, 271112, 271111 to
liquefied gases. Once the series have the same units, we aggregate them. The
internal flows of the countries that do not appear explicitly in the OECD data
set are merged into the balance position ROW.
For the US, constructing the flows of coal, oil and gas from the EIA data
works reasonably well. Total production of 05 and 06 constructed using the
EIA data overestimates the original OECD aggregate 05T06 by between 0.08
and 3.56 percent with an average deviation of 1.87 percent. For the other
OECD countries, the average deviation is larger but still within reasonable
bounds. However, for smaller countries and for countries like Saudi Arabia
where the oil and gas sector dominates the domestic economy, the two magni-
tudes may differ significantly (see table 8). We discuss this point in detail in
Section 5.3.
Gravity Controls and Rest of the World Our main source for the
gravity control variables is the CEPII gravity dataset (Head et al., 2010), see
table 5 for a list of the controls included in the regression. The data on currency
unions are from De Sousa (2012), the data on countries’ internal distances are
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Table 5: Gravity Control Variables
Variable Description
distw weighted distance (pop-wt, km)
comlang off 1 for common official of primary language
comcol 1 for common colonizer post 1945
colony 1 for pair ever in colonial relationship
comcur 1 for common currency
contig 1 for contiguity
comleg pretrans 1 if common legal origins before transition
comleg posttrans 1 if common legal origins after transition
Notes: Gravity control variables used in the regression of the gravity model.
from Mayer and Head (2002).
For the balance position “rest of the world” (ROW) included in the OECD
data, we need to impose a number of assumption regarding the gravity control
variables. We need, for example, the distance between a country and the rest
of the world or whether a country and the rest of the world speak the same
language. These assumptions are for the most part arbitrary, but imposing
some assumption is necessary if we want to keep the balance position in the
data set. Keeping the balance position ROW and imposing assumptions seems
preferable than dropping ROW. In addition, changing these assumptions leaves
the estimates of the export capabilities and the trade costs of the US and its
main trading partners virtually unchanged. The estimation results of more
peripheral countries such as Morocco are only slightly affected.
We set the internal distance of ROW equal to the average internal distance
of the countries in ROW for which internal distances are available. The bilat-
eral distance between ROW and the other countries is calculated as a weighted
distances where the weights are calculated from the trade flows between coun-
tries.9 If a country shares a common border with one of the countries in ROW,
9If the rest of the world contains two countries, A and B, then the distance between
ROW and country C is calculated as wCACA+wCBCB, where CA is the distance between
C and A and the weights correspond to the shares of exports from C to A and B.
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we assume that the country shares a common border with ROW. The other
control variables are treated in the same fashion.
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Table 6: Industry Classes (ISIC Revision 4) Used in the Analysis
Industry Description Industry Linkages Data for USA 2015
In-strength Out-strength Consumption share Industry output Impact of shale
observed predicted by value percent
01T03 Agriculture 11.86 14.00 1.41 448.60 456.00 -7.37 -1.62
05 Coal -1.21 0.99 0.24 80.52 85.20 -4.68 -5.49
06 Crude oil and gas -0.77 -0.12 2.72 765.2 366.60 398.6 108.72
07T08 Non-energy mining 3.05 2.17 0.21 64.76 68.91 -4.15 -6.02
09 Mining services 10.89 1.47 0.27 87.77 90.83 -3.06 -3.37
10T12 Food products 14.08 32.17 3.02 924.20 943.70 -19.49 -2.07
13T15 Textiles 15.72 20.40 0.66 85.16 92.38 -7.22 -7.81
16 Wood products 16.66 14.26 0.34 98.16 100.20 -2.08 -2.07
17T18 Paper & printing 17.10 17.35 0.82 266.30 273.10 -6.75 -2.47
19 Refined petroleum 7.68 2.15 1.46 482.90 436.70 46.20 10.58
20T21 Chemicals 6.76 5.60 2.56 771.80 815.50 -43.77 -5.37
22 Plastic products 14.97 18.18 0.77 226.30 238.80 -12.55 -5.25
23 Metallic minerals 9.87 5.30 0.42 118.90 117.70 1.24 1.05
24 Basic metals 8.44 7.39 0.80 221.10 229.60 -8.49 -3.70
25 Metal products 14.70 22.82 1.21 361.10 375.10 -13.98 -3.73
26 Computers 21.21 9.89 1.24 366.00 404.80 -38.88 -9.60
27 Electrical equipment 18.78 14.85 0.48 119.74 123.80 -4.06 -3.27
28 Machinery 14.28 19.07 1.25 362.22 388.80 -26.58 -6.84
29 Vehicles, trailers 24.04 9.72 2.52 637.80 703.10 -65.30 -9.29
30 Transport equipment 24.31 5.89 0.83 318.54 329.00 -10.46 -3.18
Continued on next page
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Table 6 – Continued from previous page
Industry Description Industry Linkages Data for USA 2015
In-strength Out-strength Consumption share Industry output Impact of shale
observed predicted by value percent
31T43 Construction 16.36 20.87 6.79 2071.38 2081.00 -10.62 -0.51
45T47 Wholesale trade 9.77 32.53 9.25 2934.00 2951.95 -20.26 -0.69
49T53 Transportation 9.72 23.85 3.53 1107.02 1124.97 -17.95 -1.6
55T56 Accommodation & food 12.12 30.49 2.95 905.70 909.60 -3.91 -0.43
58T60 Publishing 13.96 6.81 1.96 648.20 649.70 -1.46 -0.23
61 Telecommunications 4.16 2.96 1.96 634.70 632.30 2.44 0.39
62T63 IT 18.59 6.14 1.94 576.20 593.30 -17.16 -2.89
64T66 Finance & insurance 10.52 6.19 7.03 2291.00 2322.00 -31.13 -1.34
68 Real estate activities 11.65 12.50 9.53 3000.12 3002.51 -2.39 -0.08
69T82 Technical services 10.37 11.11 10.24 3342.78 3366.13 -23.35 -0.69
84T85 Education and government 11.56 3.79 12.08 3807.31 3809.75 2.44 0.06
86T88 Health and social work 11.73 9.80 6.95 2187.01 2187.17 -0.16 -0.01
90T98 Entertainment 10.65 12.98 2.59 819.70 819.99 -0.29 -0.04
Table 6: Industry classes (ISIC Revision 4) used in the analysis, and additional informa-
tion. In-strength and out-strength are respectively the row-sum and column-sum of the
linkage matrix. Predicted output from baseline comparative statics exercise.
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Table 7: List of Countries Included in the Analysis
Exporter ISO 3 Population GDP per Wage Impact of EIA 05T06
(million) capita ($1000) (relative to basket) shale Discrepancy
observed predicted percent percent
Argentina ARG 43.42 10.50 0.49 0.49 0.15 1.60
Australia AUS 23.82 55.10 2.73 2.73 -0.01 5.40
Austria AUT 8.64 47.85 2.95 2.95 0.19 -1.70
Belgium BEL 11.27 45.16 2.65 2.64 0.08 7.50
Bulgaria BGR 7.18 7.61 0.40 0.40 0.02 8.20
Brazil BRA 206 11.35 0.52 0.52 0.01 1.50
Brunei Darussalam* BRN 0.42 32.66 2.50 2.52 -0.79 -1.60
Canada CAN 35.83 50.30 2.24 2.27 -1.43 1.00
Switzerland CHE 8.28 76.55 5.05 5.04 0.27 2.40
Chile CHL 17.76 14.89 0.76 0.76 0.12 3.40
China CHN 1371 6.50 0.36 0.36 0.18 1.30
Colombia COL 48.23 7.46 0.26 0.26 -0.86 8.80
Czech Republic CZE 10.55 21.38 1.34 1.33 0.24 5.70
Germany DEU 81.69 45.52 2.96 2.95 0.24 5.70
Denmark DNK 5.68 60.40 3.69 3.69 0.13 1.40
Spain ESP 46.44 30.60 1.77 1.77 0.11 9.60
Estonia* EST 1.32 17.77 1.00 1.00 0.07 —
Finland FIN 5.48 45.32 2.50 2.49 0.14 9.90
France FRA 66.59 41.77 2.25 2.25 0.18 10.50
United Kingdom GBR 65.13 41.76 2.21 2.21 0.18 1.50
Continued on next page
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Table 7 – Continued from previous page
Exporter ISO 3 Population GDP per Wage Impact of EIA 05T06
(million) capita ($1000) (relative to basket) shale Discrepancy
observed predicted percent percent
Greece GRC 10.82 22.62 1.19 1.19 -0.19 14.00
Hong Kong*, China HKG 7.29 36.26 1.42 1.42 0.22 —
Croatia HRV 4.2 14.11 0.75 0.75 0.06 -4.00
Hungary HUN 9.84 14.65 0.86 0.86 0.21 14.00
Indonesia IDN 258.2 3.83 0.20 0.20 0.05 1.80
India IND 1309 1.75 0.09 0.09 0.11 2.50
Ireland IRL 4.7 67.72 4.29 4.28 0.37 -2.40
Israel ISR 8.38 33.18 1.87 1.86 0.19 3.90
Italy ITA 60.73 33.96 2.05 2.05 0.16 -0.10
Japan JPN 127.1 47.16 2.35 2.34 0.30 10.60
Kazakhstan KAZ 17.54 10.62 0.69 0.69 -0.40 5.10
Korea KOR 51.01 24.87 1.43 1.43 0.23 11.90
Lithuania LTU 2.9 15.38 0.87 0.87 -0.16 9.70
Luxembourg* LUX 0.575 107.24 6.70 6.68 0.30 —
Latvia* LVA 1.98 14.28 0.60 0.60 0.01 —
Morocco MAR 34.80 3.21 0.12 0.12 0.10 -17.00
Mexico MEX 125.9 9.72 0.53 0.54 -1.12 -7.20
Malaysia MYS 30.72 10.75 0.61 0.61 0.06 -0.70
Netherlands NLD 16.94 51.87 3.15 3.15 0.05 -0.70
Norway NOR 5.19 90.13 5.75 5.77 -0.31 1.00
New Zealand NZL 4.606 37.04 1.82 1.82 0.18 0.00
Continued on next page
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Table 7 – Continued from previous page
Exporter ISO 3 Population GDP per Wage Impact of EIA 05T06
(million) capita ($1000) (relative to basket) shale Discrepancy
observed predicted percent percent
Peru PER 31.38 5.94 0.27 0.27 -0.10 -0.90
Philippines PHL 101.70 2.62 0.11 0.11 0.23 6.60
Poland POL 37.99 14.64 0.88 0.88 0.17 2.70
Portugal PRT 10.36 22.02 1.20 1.20 0.08 4.90
Romania ROU 19.82 9.71 0.52 0.52 0.10 6.00
Rest of the World ROW 2035.00 n.a. 0.10 0.10 -0.73 0.40
Russian Federation RUS 144.10 11.33 1.08 1.08 -0.37 1.00
Saudi Arabia* SAU 31.56 21.51 1.22 1.23 -0.94 -36.50
Singapore* SGP 5.54 52.79 3.14 3.14 0.01 —
Slovak Republic SVK 5.42 18.74 1.08 1.08 0.20 7.00
Slovenia SVN 2.06 23.73 1.41 1.41 0.12 11.90
Sweden SWE 9.80 55.42 3.40 3.39 0.17 1.10
Thailand THA 68.66 5.74 0.34 0.34 0.16 3.70
Tunisia TUN 11.27 4.27 0.18 0.18 0.03 1.50
Turkey TUR 78.27 13.90 0.68 0.68 0.08 1.00
Chinese Taipei TWN 23.49 46.96 2.08 2.07 0.18 11.30
United States USA 320.7 52.10 2.35 2.33 0.84 1.90
Viet Nam VNM 93.57 1.65 0.09 0.09 0.16 -5.00
South Africa ZAF 55.29 7.58 0.37 0.37 0.04 7.40
Continued on next page
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Table 7 – Continued from previous page
Exporter ISO 3 Population GDP per Wage Impact of EIA 05T06
(million) capita ($1000) (relative to basket) shale Discrepancy
observed predicted percent percent
Notes: Countries included in the Analysis. Data for population and per capita income
are 2015 data from the World Bank. Observed wage is equilibrium wage of the model in
2015. Basket is geometric average wage in all countries (unweighted). Predicted wage is
from baseline comparative statics exercise for 2015. Impact of shale is difference between
observed and predicted wage, in percent. EIA 05T06 Discrepancy is percentage difference
between internal trade as reported by the OECD (in monetary units) and internal trade
as reported by the EIA (converted into monetary units using import prices). Discrepancy
not reported when either OECD or EIA data is missing. * Countries not included in the
smaller sample of 53 countries (see section 5.3.2 ).
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Table 8: Robustness Analysis
Industry Equilibrium Comparative Statics
Exercise Trade Elasticity (θ) Number of Countries
06 06 & 09 06 & Cost 3 6 8 60 53
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
01T03 5.62 6.38 6.32 6.38 6.31 6.38 6.86 6.38 5.94
05 10.65 16.27 16.43 16.27 16.10 16.27 21.65 16.27 13.31
06 24.88 5.94 6.38 5.94 5.95 5.94 1.67 5.94 8.19
07T08 0.46 0.66 0.61 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.85 0.66 0.44
09 0.06 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.19 0.11 0.10
10T12 3.52 4.26 4.23 4.26 4.21 4.26 4.80 4.26 3.92
13T15 2.13 2.52 2.57 2.52 2.50 2.52 2.8 2.52 2.52
16.00 7.72 8.78 8.91 8.78 8.70 8.78 9.45 8.78 8.00
17T18 16.74 19.51 19.57 19.51 19.33 19.51 21.40 19.51 17.11
19 19.48 14.44 14.55 14.44 14.34 14.44 11.05 14.44 15.45
20T21 14.54 17.54 17.59 17.54 17.39 17.54 19.75 17.54 16.07
22 16 19.94 20.02 19.94 19.77 19.94 22.99 19.94 17.90
23 4.29 4.34 4.45 4.34 4.30 4.34 4.26 4.34 4.28
24 6.13 6.96 6.93 6.96 6.90 6.96 7.49 6.96 6.72
25 18.91 22.29 22.11 22.29 22.12 22.29 24.7 22.29 20.28
26 16.84 22.27 21.42 22.27 22.09 22.27 26.75 22.27 20.75
27 15.01 16.28 15.87 16.28 16.18 16.28 16.97 16.28 15.88
28 25.47 29.35 29.4 29.35 29.2 29.35 32.07 29.35 28.26
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
29 12.38 16.48 16.16 16.48 16.32 16.48 19.93 16.48 15.57
30 25.07 27.54 27.48 27.54 27.35 27.54 28.98 27.54 29.69
31T43 0.85 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.10 1.00 0.94
45T47 5.87 6.45 6.49 6.45 6.38 6.45 6.76 6.45 6.68
49T53 8.05 9.02 9.041 9.02 8.94 9.02 9.61 9.02 8.40
55T56 0.31 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.33
58T60 21.23 22.57 22.65 22.57 22.39 22.57 23.16 22.57 23.32
61 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.39 0.37
62T63 19.72 23.77 22.38 23.77 23.62 23.77 26.79 23.77 22.13
64T66 2.32 2.89 2.80 2.89 2.86 2.89 3.34 2.89 3.10
68 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
69T82 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.17
84T85 1.45 1.42 1.47 1.42 1.41 1.42 1.36 1.42 1.28
86T88 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
90T98 0.82 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.89 0.87 0.87
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Notes: US market shares in Mexico in 2015 in percent. Column 2: Market
share observed in the data. Columns 3 to 5: Market shares for three compar-
ative statics exercises. Columns 6 to 8: Market shares for different values of
the trade elasticity θ. Columns 9 and 10: Market shares for different sample
of countries. Countries excluded in the smaller sample: Saudi Arabia, Brunei,
Estonia, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Latvia, Singapore.63
